Quarantine: Legal Reform for 21st Century Crises by Pennell, Joseph
 
Quarantine: Legal Reform for 21st Century Crises
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Joseph Pennell, Quarantine: Legal Reform for 21st Century Crises
(May 2008).
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:22:30 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8592047
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAAQuarantine: Legal Reform for 21st Century Crises 
 
 
 
 
Joseph M. Pennell 
Class of 2008 
May 2008 
Submitted in satisfaction of the course requirement 
Submitted in satisfaction of option 2 of the 3L paper requirement 
   2 
Abstract 
 
  Legal  authority  for  quarantine  predates  the  American  Revolution,  and  was 
implicitly authorized by the Constitution.  State and federal quarantine law remained 
static  during  the  latter  half  of  the  20th  century  despite  expansive  interpretations  of 
procedural  due  process  rights.    After  the  events  of  September  11,  2001  and  the 
subsequent anthrax murders, lawmakers and academics began developing new laws and 
regulations to address threats such as bioterrorism and pandemic disease.  The sweeping 
powers of these new laws and regulations faced harsh criticism from civil libertarians.  
This paper discusses legal authority for quarantine up through the early 20th century, the 
20th century Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting future quarantine powers, the post-
9/11 attempts to reform state and federal quarantine law, and the criticism those attempts 
have faced. 
   3 
Historical Foundations of Quarantine Law 
 
  Separating diseased individuals from the larger population is a practice at least as 
ancient as the Old Testament, which describes procedures for identifying and isolating 
lepers.
1  During the plague epidemics of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, 
merchant vessels were forced to anchor outside Italian ports for forty days to identify any 
latent contagion.  The Italian word for these forty days of isolation was quarantenaria, 
which became the foundation of the English word “quarantine.”
2   
  Quarantine  practices  in  America  began  at  least  as  early  as  1647,  when  the 
Massachusetts  Bay  Colony  blocked  vessels  from  the  West  Indies  during  a  plague 
outbreak.
3  Quarantine was generally considered a function of state and local government, 
but  the  U.S.  Constitution’s  Commerce  Clause
4  granted  Congress  authority  over  state 
quarantine laws “for the regulation of commerce.”
5 
Quarantine Jurisprudence: Pre-Warren Court 
  Until  the  mid-20th  century,  quarantine  powers  were  frequently  exercised  to 
combat a variety of epidemics,
6 and courts generally showed significant deference to the 
                                                 
1 Leviticus 14:4-8 and Numbers 5:2;  LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 204-5 (2002). 
2 Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine,14 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 
53, 55 (1985) (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1175 (unabr. ed. 1967) and 
W. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 151 (1976)). 
3 Kathleen S. Swendiman & Jennifer K. Elsea, Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority, CRS 
Report RL33201, at 1 (Jan. 23, 2007). 
4 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 205-06 (1824). 
6 See, e.g., Varholy v. Sweat, 15 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1943)(venereal disease); Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 
(S.C. 1909)(leprosy); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900)(bubonic plague); Hengehold 
v. City of Covington, 57 S.W. 495 (Ky. 1900)(smallpox); Rudolphe v. City of New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 
242 (L.A. 1854)(cholera); In re Martin, 188 P.2d 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)(venereal disease); Illinois v. 
Tait, 103 N.E. 750 (Ill. 1913)(scarlet fever); In re Halko, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1966)(tuberculosis).   4 
judgment of state and local officials ordering these measures.
7  Plaintiffs often alleged 
that state officials acted beyond the scope of their delegated authority.
8  Many plaintiffs 
demanded economic damages in connection with state action against their property,
9 as 
opposed to damages for unconstitutional deprivation of personal liberty.
10 
The Modern Legal Foundation for Quarantine: Jacobson v. Massachusetts 
  Jacobson  v.  Massachusetts  is  the  seminal  case  delineating  the  state’s  broad 
authority  to  curtail  individual  liberty  in  furtherance  of  the  public  good.
11    Reverend 
Henning Jacobson, a Swedish immigrant and community leader, had refused compulsory 
vaccination for smallpox and was fined five dollars pursuant to a state statute.
12  After 
concluding that the compulsory vaccination law had a real and substantial relation to 
protecting  the  public’s  health,  the  Court  rejected  Jacobson’s  claim  that  he  had  been 
unconstitutionally deprived of his liberty.
13 
The Court’s holding established a reasonableness test that continues to apply to 
public health law (including quarantine law): “[T]he police power of a State must be held 
to  embrace,  at  least,  such  reasonable  regulations  established  directly  by  legislative 
                                                 
7 See Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine, supra note 2, at 62-66; David P. Fidler et al., Through the Quarantine 
Looking Glass: Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis and Public Health Governance, Law, and Ethics, J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS, 616, 621 (Winter 2007)(“This jurisprudence reveals deference by the courts, which usually 
regarded isolation or quarantine actions as presumptively valid.”); Swendiman & Elsea, Federal and State 
Quarantine and Isolation Authority, supra note 3, at 13-14 (courts reluctant to interfere with public health 
police powers unless the adopted regulations are “arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable.”)(quoting People 
ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson 134 N.E. 815, 817 (Ill. 1922)(citations omitted)). 
8 See, e.g., Illinois v. Tait, 103 N.E. 750 (Ill. 1913) (conviction for violation of quarantine order upheld). 
9 See, e.g., White v. City of San Antonio, 60 S.W. 426 (Tex. 1901) (denying hotel owner’s damages claim 
for lost business when city quarantined Yellow Fever victims in hotel); Allison v. Cash, 137 S.W. 245 (Ky. 
1911) (holding that destruction of store owner’s inventory during necessary fumigation was legal, and that 
closure of plaintiff’s store during smallpox inquiry was not a taking entitled to just compensation). 
10 See Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine, supra note 2, at 60 n. 46 (noting that courts were unsympathetic to 
individual rights claims “that could not be reduced to freedom of contract,” and that plaintiffs “faced 
insurmountable procedural difficulties” before Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), “facilitated the ability 
to bring constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). 
11 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
12 Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights versus the Public’s Health–100 Years after Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 352 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 652, 653 (2005). 
13 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37-39.   5 
enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety,”
14  Unless a state acted 
in an “arbitrary, unreasonable manner,” or beyond “what was necessary for the public 
health or the public safety,” courts would not interfere with public health decisions.
15 
The era of Jacobson 
  The Supreme Court’s Jacobson holding gave lower courts significant discretion in 
analyzing quarantine law.  Jacobson allowed lower courts to draw the line between what 
was “reasonable” versus “arbitrary,” and they often drew the line in a way that favored 
state intervention.  Courts’ decisions seemed to be influenced by three major factors: (1) 
the  background  of  the  plaintiff;  (2)  proof  of  exposure  or  illness;  (3)  any  overtly 
discriminatory  intent.    The  jurisprudence,  however,  is  hardly  uniform,  and  often 
conflicting. 
  The Background of the Plaintiff.  Throughout the pre-civil rights era, socially 
undesirable  individuals  failed  in  their  legal  challenges  to  state-imposed  quarantines.  
Drunks
16, suspected prostitutes
17, and immigrants
18 had little recourse in challenging the 
actions of state and local health officials.  A boatload of Italian immigrants, unsuspected 
of carrying any disease, were successfully prohibited from landing in Louisiana pursuant 
to a statute providing: 
                                                 
14 Id. at 25. 
15 Id. at 27-28. 
16 See, e.g., Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571 (Fl. 1943)(upheld detention and treatment of woman found to 
have gonorrhea after her original arrest for drunk and disorderly conduct). 
17 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Baker v. Strautz, 54 N.E. 2d 441, 444 (Ill. 1944)(suspected prostitutes called 
“natural subjects and carriers of venereal disease” that are “logical[ly] and natural[ly]” subject to 
“suspicion”).  But cf. In re Application of Shepard, 195 P. 1077 (Cal. 1921)(holding that woman’s consent 
to exchange money for sex was insufficient reason to believe she was afflicted with venereal disease and 
subject to quarantine). 
18 See, e.g., Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 
380, 385 (1902)(upholding Louisiana’s authority to deny entrance to immigrants who would act as “added 
fuel” to the flames of a pre-existing contagion in the state).   6 
The state Board of Health may, in its discretion, prohibit the introduction 
into any infected portion of the state, persons acclimated, unacclimated or 
said to be immune, when in its judgment the introduction of such persons 
would add to increase the prevalence of the disease.
19 
 
The Supreme Court deferred to the Louisiana State Board of Health’s judgment, despite 
that Board’s stated intent to declare a quarantine in any part of the state necessary to 
prevent the immigrants’ arrival.
20 
  In Ex parte Company, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a suspected prostitute’s 
claims against the constitutionality of the following broad quarantine powers:  
Regulation 23 empowers the health commissioner of each city to make 
examination of persons reasonably suspected of having a venereal disease.  
All  known  prostitutes  and  persons  associating  with  them  shall  be 
considered  as  reasonably  suspected  of  having  a  venereal  disease.  
Regulation 24 provides that the health commissioner may quarantine any 
person who has, or is reasonably suspected of having, a venereal disease, 
whenever in his opinion quarantine is necessary for the protection of the 
public health.
21 
 
In contrast, when “a woman of culture and refinement” contracted leprosy during 
a mission to South America, the Supreme Court of South Carolina would not allow her to 
be quarantined in: 
the city pest house, coarse and comfortless, used only for the purpose of 
incarcerating negroes having smallpox and other dangerous and infectious 
diseases . . . adjoin[ing] the city dumping grounds, where the offal of the 
city is deposited, from which arise foul and unhealthy odors.
22 
 
Proof of Exposure or Illness.  After World War I, courts began to increasingly 
question  the  proof  and  legal  procedure  followed  by  health  officials  in  imposing 
                                                 
19 Id. at 385. 
20 Id. at 380. 
21 Ex parte Company, 139 N.E. 204, 205 (Ohio 1922). 
22 Kirk v. Bd. of Health, 65 S.E. 387, 388 (S.C. 1909).   7 
quarantine.
23  This change in judicial attitude was made possible by two major trends.  
First, communities were beset by fewer acute, short-lived diseases requiring immediate 
action (e.g., smallpox, plague) and by more chronic, long-term diseases (e.g., venereal 
disease and tuberculosis).
24  “With both [VD and TB], but particularly with tuberculosis, 
individuals could be quarantined for long periods of time because neither disease kills 
quickly.
25  Second, by mid-century, both VD and TB were generally treatable, and thus 
did not generate the fears that had precipitated quarantines in earlier years.
26  Both of 
these trends allowed courts to more closely scrutinize the proof and procedure undertaken 
by public health officials without significantly increasing risk to the public.   
Health officials’ decisions were still treated with relative deference, but many 
courts began to require those officials to present “sufficient and competent evidence” that 
the quarantined individual was actually exposed to, or ill from, an infectious disease.
27  
The  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa  ordered  a  man  “suspected”  of  gonorrhea  released  after 
finding quarantine “applicable only ‘when any person shall be sick or infected with any 
contagious  or  infectious  disease,’”  and  not  when  a  person  was  “merely  suspected  of 
disease.”
28 
Overtly Discriminatory Intent.  Some courts were loathe to uphold quarantine 
actions  that  seemed  motivated  by  racial  animus  as  opposed  to  protecting  the  public 
                                                 
23 Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine, supra note 2, at 68-69.   
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., State v. Snow 324 S.W.2d 532, 533-34 (Ark. 1959)(commitment to a tuberculosis sanatorium 
denied where the state failed to introduce any evidence of plaintiff’s TB from x-rays or sputum tests). 
28 Wragg v. Griffin, 170 N.W. 400, 402 (Iowa 1919).  But cf. Reynolds v. McNichols, 488 F.2d 1378, 1382 
(10th Cir. 1973)(“It is not illogical or unreasonable, and on the contrary it is reasonable, to suspect that 
known prostitutes are a prime source of infectious venereal disease. Prostitution and venereal disease are no 
strangers.”).   8 
health.  During a plague scare
29 in the spring of 1900, the city of San Francisco refused to 
let Chinese residents leave the city limits unless they agreed to inoculation with Haffkine 
Prophylactic.
30  Roughly fifteen thousand Chinese residents were subject to this restraint, 
even though white residents in their same neighborhoods were not, belying the notion 
that  officials  were  trying  to  contain  the  spread  of  an  epidemic.
31    In  Wong  Wai  v. 
Williamson,  the  plaintiff  launched  a  successful  equal  protection  challenge  to  this 
inoculation  requirement.
32  Moreover,  the  court  demonstrated  that  the  inoculation 
requirement was wholly inappropriate to the Board of Health’s stated goal of protecting 
those exposed to plague: 
The Haffkine material should not be used if the person has been definitely 
exposed to the plague, or is thought to be in the incubative period; for, if 
by chance he is already infected, the Haffkine injection may produce fatal 
results. Therefore the Haffkine material should be used as a preventive on 
persons before their exposure, while the Yersin treatment may be used 
either before or after exposure, or while a person is suffering with the 
disease. The Haffkine material should not be used on suspects held in 
quarantine, or on persons who have been definitely exposed to the plague, 
but is applicable to persons who are liable to be brought into contact with 
plague,  and  before  such  possible  contact,  as  quarantine  officers  and 
attendants, health officers and employes[sic], and persons in a community 
where there is danger of the introduction and spread of the disease.
33 
 
Thus,  the  court  found  that  “the  administration  of  Haffkine  Prophylactic  to  Chinese 
persons  departing  from  San  Francisco  has  no  relation  to  the  public  health  of  the 
                                                 
29 In spite of the pronouncements of public officials, one expert stated “there has not been found a single 
living case of said disease.”  Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 21 (C.C.N.D. Cal 1900)(quoting the 
affidavit of Dr. J. I. Stephen). 
30 Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 5 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900). 
31 The city justified its ordinance by claiming the “Asiatic race” was “more liable to the plague than any 
other” race, but offered no evidence or proof of its claim.  Id. at 7.  Moreover, the city had "no pretense that 
previous residence, habits, exposure to disease, method of living, or physical condition has anything to do 
with their classification as subject to the regulations.”  Id. at 9. 
32 Id. at 9. 
33Id. at 7-8 (quoting the instructions of the supervising surgeon general of the marine hospital service on 
selecting a proper plague inoculant).   9 
inhabitants of this city, and cannot be sustained by any such claim on the part of its board 
of health”
34 
  The city of San Francisco’s actions were subject to further judicial condemnation 
in Jew Ho v. Williamson,
35 which struck down physical restrictions on Chinese within the 
quarantine zone.  Without attempting to isolate the houses of the alleged plague victims, 
the city had restricted Chinese movement in twelve city blocks, thereby increasing the 
danger that the disease would spread further within this wide area.
36  The court rejected 
this exercise of the police power as ineffective for its purpose (i.e.  “preventing the spread 
of such diseases among the inhabitants of such localities”), and held that the quarantine 
“was not a reasonable regulation to accomplish the purposes sought.”
37  The court further 
criticized the quarantine as being applied “with an evil eye and an unequal hand” to 
Chinese only, and therefore held the ordinance invalid as “contrary to the provisions of 
the fourteenth amendment.”
38 
Summary.  By the time the Warren court began to revolutionize constitutional and 
civil rights jurisprudence, lower courts had become gradually less deferential to public 
health officials in response to changing public attitudes and transformed epidemiology.  
Advances in medicine brought an effective halt to most of the lethal epidemics of earlier 
times, and the status of quarantine law remained, for the most part, static for several 
decades to come. 
 
                                                 
34 Id. at 9. 
35 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900). 
36 “If we are to suppose that this bubonic plague has existed in San Francisco since the 6th day of March, 
and that there has been danger of its spreading over the city, the most dangerous thing that could have been 
done was to quarantine the whole city, as to the Chinese, as was substantially done in the first instance.”  
Id. at 22. 
37 Id. at 21-23. 
38 Id. at 24 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)).   10 
The Civil Rights Era: Indirect Effects on Quarantine Law  
  Courts  in  the  latter  half  of  the  twentieth  century  increasingly  demanded 
procedural due process protections for those deprived of liberty or property.
39  The focus 
on  procedure  was  a  dramatic  change  from  a  hundred  years  earlier,  when  one  court 
declared that a warrant “could be of no importance to a sick man,” and held constitutional 
a quarantine statute containing “no provision for any examination by the justices, nor for 
notice to any parties to be heard, nor could any appeal be had.”
40  The post-deprivation 
remedies of habeas corpus and suits for damages
41 that were generally a plaintiff’s only 
recourse were no longer seen as constitutionally sufficient.
42 
  Despite a few notable exceptions,
43 there have been few cases examining state 
quarantine actions since the landmark 1970’s decisions on procedural due process.  There 
have  been  a  number  of  cases,  however,  concerning  the  analogous  situation  of  civil 
commitment proceedings for the mentally ill and mentally retarded.
44  “Although civil 
commitment cases often concern the mentally ill, the principles these cases enunciate also 
                                                 
39 See Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine, supra note 2, at 78; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 
(1976)(procedural due process in fifth amendment context); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 
(1972)(fourteenth amendment context). 
40 Haverty v. Bass, 66 Me. 71, 73 (Me. 1876).  But see Kirk v. Wyman, supra note 7, at 379 (requiring 
notice and hearing before quarantine imposed, except in emergency circumstances). 
41 Id. at 74 (“If an injury is inflicted upon a person by the malice of the public servants, he has a remedy for 
it. And the petition for habeas corpus is always open to him.”); People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson 134 
N.E. 815, 819 (Ill. 1922)(“Where one has been arrested and placed under quarantine on the ground that he 
is afflicted with a contagious disease he has the right to have the legality of his detention inquired into by 
habeas corpus.”)(citing ex parte Hartcastle, 208 S.W. 531 (Ct. Crim. App. Tex. 1919)). 
42 See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 662 (W. Va. 1980)(tuberculosis control act 
unconstitutional for lack of procedural due process). 
43 Id.; Souvannarath v. Hadden, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (public health authorities violated 
quarantine statute by detaining noncompliant multi-drug resistant tuberculosis patient in a county jail); City 
of New York v. Doe, 614 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)(detention order upheld after clear and 
convincing evidence that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective in treating respondent’s multi-
drug resistant TB); City of New York v. Antoinette R., 630 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (detention order upheld after 
clear and convincing evidence that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective in treating historically 
noncompliant respondent’s TB). 
44 See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).   11 
apply to isolation and quarantine measures.”
45  Cases concerning civil commitment of the 
mentally  ill  apply  to  isolation  and  quarantine  because  “involuntary  commitment  for 
having  communicable  [diseases]  impinges  on  the  right  to  liberty  .  .  .  no  less  than 
involuntary commitment for being mentally ill.”
46  Thus, to understand how courts might 
handle future legal challenges to quarantine, mental health civil commitment cases are 
considered the best guidance. 
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Retarded 
  In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court held that even if a mental patient’s 
“original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis” of potential 
harm to himself and others, that confinement could not constitutionally continue simply 
based on mental illness if he was no longer dangerous.
47  In a concurring opinion, Chief 
Justice  Burger  set  out  three  constitutional  requirements  for  civil  commitment  of  an 
individual,  namely  that  (1)  such  commitment  “must  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  a 
legitimate state interest,” (2) that the reasons for commitment “must be established in an 
appropriate proceeding,” and (3) that “confinement must cease when those reasons no 
longer exist.”
48 
  In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that the state must justify civil 
commitment for mental illness “by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of 
                                                 
45 Fidler et al., Through the Quarantine Looking Glass, supra note 7, at 621. 
46 Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980).  See also O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 
580 (“There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, like involuntary 
commitment of an individual for any reason [e.g., quarantine], is a deprivation of liberty which the state 
cannot accomplish with due process of law.”)(Burger, C.J., concurring)(citing Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 
605, 608 (1967)). 
47 422 U.S. 563, 574-76 (1975)(“[T]he mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person from 
preferring his home to the comforts of an institution.”). 
48 Id. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring)(citing McNeil  v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 249-
50 (1972); Jackson  v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).   12 
the evidence” in order to satisfy due process.
49  Rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that 
proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” was necessary, the Court stated that “[g]iven the lack 
of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to 
whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both 
mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.”
50  The Court remanded to the Texas Supreme 
Court for “determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than the ‘clear and 
convincing’  standard  which  we  hold  is  required  to  meet  due  process  guarantees.”
51  
Showcasing the more modern approach to due process rights, the Court reached this 
holding  by  balancing  “the  individual's  interest  in  not  being  involuntarily  confined 
indefinitely  and  the  state's  interest  in  committing  the  emotionally  disturbed  under  a 
particular standard of proof,” while also endeavoring “to minimize the risk of erroneous 
decisions.”
52 
  One year later in Vitek v. Jones, the Court held that a prisoner transferred to a 
mental  hospital  required  greater  procedural  protections  than  a  single  opinion  from  a 
psychiatrist  that  the  transfer  was  necessary.
53  The  Court  noted  that  involuntary 
commitment results in a loss of liberty as a result of both the confinement itself and the 
social stigma attached to mental health commitment,
54  and that these were “the kind of 
                                                 
49 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979). 
50 Id. at 429-30 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); 
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 860-61 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (opinion concurring in result)). 
51 Id. at 433.   
52 Id. at 425 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-
26 (1958)). 
53 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)(“Nebraska's reliance on the opinion of a designated physician or psychologist 
for determining whether the conditions warranting a transfer exist neither removes the prisoner's interest 
from due process protection nor answers the question of what process is due under the Constitution.”). 
54 Id. at 492 (“The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom 
from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment to a mental hospital ‘can engender adverse social 
consequences to the individual’ and that ‘[whether] we label this phenomena “stigma” or choose to call it 
something else . . . we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the 
individual.’”)(quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)).   13 
deprivations  of  liberty  that  require[]  procedural  protections.”
55    Conceding  that  “the 
interest of the State in segregating and treating mentally ill patients is strong,” the Court 
found  that  the  prisoner’s  interest,  coupled  with  the  risk  of  error  in  mental  health 
determinations, still warranted procedural safeguards including notice, counsel, and an 
adversarial hearing before an independent decisionmaker.
56  Importantly, “[t]he medical 
nature of the inquiry” did “not justify dispensing with due process requirements.”
57 
  Youngberg v. Romeo presented the question whether an involuntarily committed 
mentally  retarded  man  had  substantive  due  process  rights  to  “(i)  safe  conditions  of 
confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training or ‘habilitation.’”
58  
Disposing of part (i), the Court stated “the right to personal security constitutes a ‘historic 
liberty interest’ protected substantively by the Due Process Clause,” and that such right is 
not extinguished by confinement.
59  Similarly, (ii) freedom from bodily restraint “always 
has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process clause from 
arbitrary governmental action,” and could not be extinguished by either incarceration or 
involuntary commitment.
 60  
Romeo’s profound mental retardation led to bouts of violent and self-destructive 
behavior, and therefore the Court held that he had a constitutional right to (iii) training 
“as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his [(i)] safety and to 
facilitate  his  ability  to  function  [(ii)]  free  from  bodily  restraints.”
61    By  defining  a 
constitutional right in terms of a medical professional’s judgment, the Court sought to 
                                                 
55 Id. at 494. 
56 Id. at 496. 
57 Id. at 495. 
58 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982). 
59 Id. at 315 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). 
60 Id. at 316 (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979)(Powell, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part)). 
61 Id. at 324.   14 
“protect the rights of the individual without unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the 
states to deal with difficult social problems.”
62 
  In Washington v. Harper, the Court held that a violent, mentally-ill prisoner’s 
liberty  interest  in  avoiding  administration  of  antipsychotic  drugs  was  sufficiently 
addressed  in  a  non-judicial  hearing  of  medical  professionals
63    The  prisoner’s 
constitutional right to be free of medication had to be balanced against the state’s duty to 
treat mentally ill inmates and run a safe prison, and the State’s procedures did not deprive 
inmates  of  their  rights  without  sufficient  due  process.
64  “The  primary  point  of 
disagreement  between  the  parties  [was]  whether  due  process  requires  a  judicial 
decisionmaker”
65 as opposed to a medical decisionmaker, and the Court held that “an 
inmate’s interests are adequately protected, and perhaps better served by,” a medically 
trained, non-judicial decisionmaker.
66 
  Furthermore, the opinion rejected the prisoner’s argument that his hearing was 
inadequate  because  he  was  not  afforded  counsel.    “‘It  is  less  than  crystal  clear  why 
lawyers must be available to identify possible errors in medical judgment.’”
67  Contrary 
to  the  holding  in  Addington  v.  Texas,
68  the  Court  held  that  a  “clear,  cogent,  and 
convincing” standard of proof was “neither required nor helpful” in determining whether 
                                                 
62 Id. at 323, n. 29 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608, n. 16 (1979)). 
63 494 U.S. 210, 222-23 (1990). 
64 Id. at 229 (“‘Under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), we consider the private interests at 
stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests involved, and the value of procedural 
requirements in determining what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment.’”)(quoting Hewitt v. 
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 473 (1983)). 
65 Id. at 228. 
66 Id. at 231.   
67 Id. at 236 (quoting Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985)(emphasis in 
original)). 
68 441 U.S. 418 (1979).   15 
to medicate the prisoner.
69  In his dissent, Justice Stevens objected that “[t]he purpose of 
this  standard  of  proof,  to  reduce  the  chances  of  inappropriate  decisions,  is  no  less 
meaningful when the factfinders are professionals as when they are judges or jurors.”
70 
The 21
st Century: Current Events Drive Reform Proposals 
  “No large-scale human quarantine has been implemented within the United States 
since  the  1918  influenza  pandemic.”
71  A  cascade  of  events  has  driven  interest  in 
updating  the  nation’s  antiquated  quarantine  laws:  the  September  11,  2001  terrorist 
attacks
72, the anthrax murders of 2001
73, fears of larger scale bioterrorist attacks
74, SARS 
outbreaks
75,  Avian  flu
76,  and  extremely  drug  resistant  (“XDR”)  tuberculosis  as 
exemplified by the Andrew Speaker case.
77  The early years of the AIDS virus prompted 
                                                 
69 Washington, 494 U.S. at 235. 
70 Id. at 255, n. 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(internal citations omitted). 
71 Swendiman & Elsea, Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority, supra note 3, at 9 n. 54. 
72 See generally White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 
2002, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf (last visited April 26, 
2008). 
73 Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and Responding 
to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622, 622 (2002)(“The intentional 
dispersal of anthrax through the US postal system in New York, Washington, and other locations resulted 
in 5 confirmed deaths, hundreds of persons treated, and thousands tested.”); Id. at 623 (“In 1991, the US 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated that the aerosolized release of 100 kg of anthrax 
spores upwind of Washington, DC, could result in approximately 130 000 to 3 million deaths, a weapon as 
deadly as a hydrogen bomb.”). 
74 See Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United States: 
Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286 JAMA 2711, 2711 
(2001)(“It is now generally acknowledged that a large-scale bioterrorist attack is plausible and could 
conceivably generate large numbers of seriously ill exposed individuals, potentially overwhelming local or 
regional health care systems.”). 
75 See generally Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe Infectious Disease Threats, 290 JAMA 3229 
(2003). 
76 See generally Lawrence O. Gostin, Medical Countermeasures for Pandemic Influenza: Ethics and the 
Law, 295 JAMA 554 (2006); Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Pandemic Influenza: Ethics 
and the Law, 295 JAMA 1700 (2006); Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman, Pandemic Influenza: 
Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121 (2007). 
77 See generally Dr. Howard Markel et al., Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis: An Isolation Order, 
Public Health Powers, and a Global Crisis, 298 JAMA 83, 83 (2007); Rose M. Gasner et al., The Use of 
Legal Action in New York City to Ensure Treatment of Tuberculosis, 340 N. ENGL. J. MED. 359 (1999).   16 
similar,  but  short-lived,  calls  for  revival  of  quarantine  law
78  based  on  shoddy 
understandings of its epidemiology.  Unlike the emergence of the AIDS virus, the twin 
pressures of the war on terrorism and potential pandemics have catalyzed lasting interest 
in quarantine over the past seven years. 
  The drive to reform quarantine law has proceeded somewhat haltingly on both the 
state  and  federal  level.    At  the  state  level,  debate  has  centered  on  the  Model  State 
Emergency Health Powers Act (the “MSEHPA”, or “Model Act”) drafted shortly after 
9/11.
79    At  the  federal  level,  proposed  revisions  to  Centers  for  Disease  Control  (the 
“CDC”) quarantine regulations have been the focus of debate.
80  Select portions of the 
MSEHPA  have  achieved  widespread  adoption
81,  while  the  attempted  federal  reforms 
have stalled.
82 
The MSEHPA and its Critics: Balancing Safety Against Liberty 
  In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, public health academics had the momentum 
for an undertaking they had long advocated: reform of American quarantine law.
83  The 
MSEHPA was the opening statement in a debate over how the U.S. should respond to the 
threat of bioterrorism and pandemic disease.  To its critics, the MSEHPA was a hastily 
drafted proposal that did not afford sufficient constitutional guarantees to the general 
                                                 
78 Tamar Lewin, Rights of Citizens and Society Raise Legal Muddle on AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1987 
(reporting that conservative icons Jesse Helms and Pat Robertson felt “quarantine may be necessary.”). 
79 The Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, The Model 
State Emergency Health Powers Act, (Dec. 21, 2001) [hereinafter The Model State Emergency Health 
Powers Act], available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 
2008). 
80 Department of Health and Human Services, Control of Communicable Diseases (Proposed Rule), 42 
CFR Parts 70 and 71 (Nov. 30, 2005). 
81 Fidler et al., Through the Quarantine Looking Glass, supra note 7, at 621 (“The review process has 
included nearly 40 states adopting, in whole or in part, the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act.”). 
82 Id. at 624. 
83 White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, supra note 72, at 
xi (identifying a review of state quarantine authorities as one of twelve major initiatives to “help enable our 
country to fight the war on terrorism more effectively.”).   17 
public.
84  To its authors, the MSEHPA was a desperately needed framework for preparing 
state government to deal with crises in a constitutionally appropriate manner.
85 
Modern Definitions of Isolation and Quarantine 
  Before discussing the MSEHPA, it is valuable to note the modern definitions of 
“quarantine” and “isolation” used in the MSEHPA and other literature on public health.  
Isolation is the physical separation and confinement of individuals who are infected or 
thought to be infected to limit the spread of disease.  Quarantine is the physical separation 
and confinement of individuals who may have been exposed to a contagious disease, but 
do not show signs or symptoms of disease, to limit the spread of disease.
86 
Purposes of the MSEHPA 
  The MSEHPA was drafted in light of two basic goals: (1) eliminating problems of 
“obsolescence, inconsistency, and inadequacy” in state laws written long before modern 
understandings  of  epidemiology;  and  (2)  updating  the  laws  to  reflect  changes  in 
constitutional law.
87 
The Model Act is structured to reflect 5 basic public health functions to be 
facilitated by law: (1) preparedness, comprehensive planning for a public 
health emergency; (2) surveillance, measures to detect and track public 
health  emergencies;  (3)  management  of  property,  ensuring  adequate 
availability  of  vaccines,  pharmaceuticals,  and  hospitals,  as  well  as 
providing power to abate hazards to the public’s health; (4) protection of 
                                                 
84 See George J. Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism: Public Health and Liberty in the 21st Century, 13 Health 
Matrix 33, 55 (Winter 2003) (“Today, all adults have the constitutional right to refuse examination and 
treatment, and such a refusal should not result in involuntary confinement simply on the say so of a public 
health official.”). 
85 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual Rights and 
Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 79, 91 (Nov./Dec. 2002)(“In summary, MSEHPA provides a modern 
framework for effective identification of and response to emerging health threats, while demonstrating 
respect for individuals and tolerance of groups.  Indeed, the [Center for Law and the Public’s Health] 
agreed to draft the law only because a much more draconian approach might have been taken by the federal 
government and the states acting on their own and responding to public fears and misapprehensions.”). 
86 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, supra note 79, at 10-11. 
87 See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for and 
Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases, 288 JAMA 622 (2002)[hereinafter 
Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism].   18 
persons, powers to compel vaccination, testing, isolation, and quarantine 
when  clearly  necessary;  and  (5)  communication,  providing  clear  and 
authoritative information to the public.  The Model Act also contains a 
modernized,  extensive  set  of  principles  and  requirements  to  safeguard 
personal rights.
88 
 
Provisions of the MSEHPA 
  “The [MSEHPA] gives rise to 2 kinds of public health powers and duties: those 
that exist in the preemergency environment . . . and a separate group of powers and duties 
that come into effect only after a state’s governor declares a public health emergency 
. . . .    Postdeclaration  powers  deliberately  are  broader  and  more  robust.”
89    The  pre-
declaration  provisions  primarily  address  pre-emergency  planning
90  and  reporting 
requirements for physicians and hospitals to notify public health authorities of developing 
trends of infection.
91  The governor may enable stronger public health powers, with or 
without consultation with health authorities, in the event of a “public health emergency,” 
which is defined as: 
[A]n occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition that: 
(1) is believed to be caused by any of the following:  
(i) bioterrorism;  
(ii) the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated 
infectious biological agent or biological toxin;  
(iii) [a natural disaster;]  
(iv) [a chemical attack or accidental release; or]  
(v) [a nuclear attack or accident]; and  
(2) poses a high probability of any of the following harms:  
(i) a large number of deaths in the affected population;  
(ii)  a  large  number  of  serious  or  long-term  disabilities  in  the 
affected population; or  
                                                 
88 Id. at 622. 
89 Id.at 625. 
90 Id. at 625-26 (“Under Article II (Planning for a Public Health Emergency), the Public Health Emergency 
Planning Commission (appointed by the governor) must prepare a plan which includes coordination of 
services; procurement of necessary materials and supplies; housing, feeding, and caring for affected 
populations (with appropriate regard for their physical and cultural/social needs); and the proper 
vaccination and treatment of individuals in the event of a public health emergency.”). 
91 Id. at 626 (“[P]ublic health, emergency management, and public safety authorities are required to share 
information necessary to prevent, treat, control, or investigate a public health emergency.”).   19 
(iii) widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses 
a significant risk of substantial future harm to a large number of 
people in the affected population.
92 
 
The state of emergency may be terminated by (1) executive order of the governor, (2) 
automatic termination in 30 days if the governor does not renew the declaration, or (3) 
majority vote of the state legislature.
93 
  Takings and Destruction of Property.  Article V of The MSEHPA provides for 
Management of Property during a public health emergency.  Public health authorities 
have permission to “close, decontaminate, or procure facilities and materials to respond 
to a public health emergency, safely dispose of infectious waste, and obtain and deploy 
health care supplies.”
94  The MSEHPA provides for “just compensation to the owner of 
any  facilities  or  materials  that  are  lawfully  taken  or  appropriated  by  a  public  health 
authority for its temporary or permanent use.”
95   
The Model Act provides no compensation, however, for “facilities and materials 
that are closed, evacuated, decontaminated, or destroyed when there is reasonable cause 
to believe that they may endanger the public health,”
96 which comports with Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on nuisance abatement.
97  The Model Act does provide that any 
destruction of property be preceded by civil proceedings to “[t]he extent practicable with 
the protection of public health.”
98  In the words of Professor Lawrence Gostin, one of the 
                                                 
92 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, supra note 79, at 11 (brackets and emphasis in original). 
93 Id. at 20. 
94 Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism, supra note 87, at 626. 
95 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, supra note 79, at 25. 
96 Id. 
97 Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism, supra note 87, at 626. 
98 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, supra note 79, at 25.   20 
primary authors of the Model Act, “[i]f the government were forced to compensate for all 
nuisance abatements, it would significantly chill public health regulation.”
99 
Conditions and Principles of Isolation and Quarantine.  “The Model Act permits 
public  health  authorities  to  physically  examine  or  test  individuals  as  necessary  to 
diagnose or to treat illness, vaccinate or treat individuals to prevent or ameliorate an 
infectious  disease,  and  isolate  or  quarantine  individuals  to  prevent  or  limit  the 
transmission of a contagious disease.”
100  The “conditions and principles” limiting the use 
of isolation and quarantine are reflective of a significantly more modern approach to 
public health than pre-existing state law: 
(1)  Isolation  and  quarantine  must  be  by  the  least  restrictive  means 
necessary to prevent the spread of a contagious or possibly contagious 
disease to others and may include, but are not limited to, confinement 
to private homes or other private and public premises. 
(2)  Isolated  individuals  must  be  confined  separately  from  quarantined 
individuals. 
(3)  The  health  status  of  isolated  and  quarantined  individuals  must  be 
monitored  regularly  to  determine  if  they  require  isolation  or 
quarantine. 
(4)  If  a  quarantined  individual  subsequently  becomes  infected  or  is 
reasonably  believed  to  have  become  infected  with  a  contagious  or 
possibly contagious disease he or she must promptly be removed to 
isolation. 
(5)  Isolated  and  quarantined  individuals  must  be  immediately  released 
when they pose no substantial risk of transmitting a contagious or 
possibly contagious disease to others. 
(6)  The needs of persons isolated and quarantined shall be addressed in a 
systematic  and  competent  fashion,  including,  but  not  limited  to, 
providing adequate food, clothing, shelter, means of communication 
with  those  in  isolation  and  quarantine  and  outside  these  settings, 
medication, and competent medical care. 
(7)  Premises used for isolation and quarantine shall be maintained in a 
safe and hygienic manner and be designed to minimize the likelihood 
of further transmission of infection or other harms to persons isolated 
and quarantined. 
                                                 
99 Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism, supra note 87, at 626. 
100 Id.   21 
(8)  To  the  extent  possible,  cultural  and  religious  beliefs  should  be 
considered  in  addressing  the  needs  of  individuals,  and  establishing 
and maintaining isolation and quarantine premises.
101 
 
Temporary  and  Longer-Lasting  Isolation  and  Quarantine.  The  Model  Act 
provides  for  either  temporary  isolation/quarantine  without  notice  or  a  more  lasting 
isolation/quarantine with notice.
102  The public health authority is authorized to execute 
temporary  isolation/quarantine  without  petitioning  a  court  if  “delay  in  imposing  the 
isolation or quarantine would significantly jeopardize the public health authority’s ability 
to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious or possibly contagious disease to 
others.”
103  This temporary quarantine may last for up to ten days.
104  Within this ten day 
period, the public health authority must file a petition “for a court order authorizing the 
continued isolation or quarantine of the isolated or quarantined individuals or groups of 
individuals.”
105   
Within twenty-four hours of the petition’s filing, individuals or groups identified 
in the petition must be given notice “in accordance with the rules of civil procedure.”
106  
A hearing must be held within five days of the petition, unless the public health authority 
shows good cause for a continuance of up to ten days in extraordinary circumstances.
107  
“[T]he court may grant [the continuance] in its discretion giving due regard to rights of 
the  affected  individuals,  the  protection  of  the  public’s  health,  the  severity  of  the 
emergency and the availability of necessary witnesses and evidence.”
108 
                                                 
101 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, supra note 79, at 27-28. 
102 Id. at 28-30. 
103 Id. at 28-29. 
104 Id. at 29. 
105 Id. This petition must show, among other things, a statement of compliance with the eight conditions 
and principles for isolation and quarantine listed on the previous page of this paper. Id. 
106 Id. 
107 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, supra note 79, at 29. 
108 Id.   22 
  The  Legal  Standard  for  Isolation  or  Quarantine.    The  court  must  “grant  the 
petition [for isolation/quarantine] if, by a preponderance of the evidence, isolation or 
quarantine is shown to be reasonably necessary to prevent or limit the transmission of a 
contagious or possibly contagious disease to others.”
109  The order authorizing isolation 
or quarantine can last no longer than thirty days, and the public health authority may 
petition for continuances, under the same standards of the original order, of no more than 
thirty additional days.
110 
  Rights of Those Isolated or Quarantined.  The isolated/quarantined individuals 
“may  apply  to  the  trial  court  for  an  order  to  show  cause  why  [they]  should  not  be 
released,” and the trial court must rule on the application to show cause within forty-eight 
hours.
111  If the application is granted, the court must schedule a hearing within twenty-
four hours.
112 
  The individuals who are isolated/quarantined (or about to be isolated/quarantined) 
must be provided with counsel at the state’s expense if they do not have their own.
113  
“To  promote  the  fair  and  efficient  operation  of  justice,”  the  court  is  permitted  to 
consolidate individual claims into groups where:  
(i)  the number of individuals involved or to be affected is so large as 
to render individual participation impractical;  
                                                 
109 Id. at 30. 
110 Id. (“The order shall (a) identify the isolated or quarantined individuals or groups of individuals by name 
or shared or similar characteristics or circumstances; (b) specify factual findings warranting isolation or 
quarantine pursuant to this Act; (c) include any conditions necessary to ensure that isolation or quarantine 
is carried out within the stated purposes and restrictions of this Act; and (d) [be] served on affected 
individuals or groups of individuals in accordance with the rules of civil procedure.”). 
111 Id. 
112 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, supra note 79, at 30. Despite this provision, “in 
extraordinary circumstances and for good cause shown the public health authority may move the court to 
extend the time for a hearing, which extension the court in its discretion may grant giving due regard to the 
rights of the affected individuals, the protection of the public’s health, the severity of the emergency and 
the availability of necessary witnesses and evidence.”  Id. at 30-31. 
113 Id. at 31.   23 
(ii)  there are questions of law or fact common to the individual claims 
or rights to be determined;  
(iii)  the  group  claims  or  rights  to  be  determined  are  typical  of  the 
affected individuals’ claims or rights; and  
(iv)  the  entire  group  will  be  adequately  represented  in  the 
consolidation.
114 
 
Compulsory  Medical  Examinations,  Vaccinations,  and  Treatments.    The 
MSEHPA provides for compulsory medical examinations, vaccinations, and treatment of 
infectious diseases during a public health emergency.
115  Those who are unwilling to 
submit to examination, vaccination, or treatment are subject to isolation or quarantine, 
even if their reluctance is due to “reasons of health, religion, or conscience.”
116  Those 
who disobey quarantine or isolation orders are guilty of a misdemeanor.
117 
Limited Liability.  State and private actors cooperating in the event of a public 
health emergency are immune from civil liability except in cases of gross negligence or 
willful misconduct.
118 
Criticism of the MSEHPA 
  “The act seems to have been drafted for a different age, and would be more at 
home in the U.S. of the 19th century rather than the 21st.”
119  This quote from Professor 
George Annas is representative of much criticism of the MSEHPA.  Professor Annas 
raises  several  concerns  with  the  Model  Act:  (1)  mass  quarantines  and  compulsory 
vaccinations will do more harm than good by creating public panic
120, and that a tradeoff 
                                                 
114 Id.  The court is required to give “due regard to the rights of the affected individuals, the protection of 
the public’s health, the severity of the emergency and the availability of necessary witnesses and evidence.”  
Id. 
115 Id. at 26-27. 
116 Id. 
117 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, supra note 79, at 28. 
118 Id. at 37. 
119 Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism, supra note 84, at 55. 
120 Id. at 56 (“[D]raconian quarantine measures seem most likely to create public panic that will encourage 
people to avoid public health officials and physicians rather than seek them out.”); Id. at 46 (“[P]lanning for   24 
between civil rights and public health is unnecessary in an informed modern society
121; 
(2) the MSEHPA’s focus on reforming state law, rather than federal law, is misguided
122; 
(3) the immunity provisions are unfair and unnecessary
123; and (4) the provisions of the 
MSEHPA are somewhat questionable under modern constitutional law.
124 
  Professor Lawrence Gostin, one of the primary authors of the act, has published 
several articles defending the MSEHPA, and makes the arguments that follow.  First, not 
everyone can be expected to comply with public health measures.
125  This point may be 
best exemplified by the case of Andrew Speaker, who disregarded public health orders to 
remain in Atlanta for treatment of XDR-TB, and instead undertook international travel to 
at  least  four  foreign  countries  before  turning  himself  in  to  the  CDC.
126    So  long  as 
                                                                                                                                                
mass quarantine and forced vaccination – likely with investigational vaccines – are unreasonable steps that 
are more likely to foster public panic and distrust than to be effective in a real emergency.”); Id. at 65  (“In 
one three day period [during the SARS outbreak], for example, after a rumor that Beijing itself might be 
quarantined or put under martial law, almost a quarter of a million migrant workers fled to rural Henan 
province; and in a small rural town, Chagugang, thousands rioted and destroyed a building that was being 
finished to quarantine SARS patients.”). 
121 Id. at 54-55 (contrasting the necessary use of quarantine in the 19th century, when “vaccination itself 
remained controversial, there were no antibiotics, physicians were not universally trusted, science and 
medicine was in its infancy, and hospitals were seen primarily as ‘pest houses’” with the modern age, 
where “it seems reasonable to think that we can predictably rely on well-informed Americans – who are not 
the enemy in a bioterrorist attack – to follow the reasonable instructions of government officials they trust 
for their own protection.”)(citing CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF 
AMERICA’S HOSPITAL SYSTEM, 15-32, 209-11 (1987)); Jonathan Bor, Americans are Taking Antibiotics 
into Own Hands, in Case of Anthrax: Officials Vainly Caution Against Stockpiling, Random Self-
medication, BALT. SUN, Oct. 13, 2001, at 5A (describing the public’s overly enthusiastic desire to treat 
themselves for possible anthrax exposure). 
122 Id.at 53-54 (“[B]ioterrorism is a matter of national security, not just state police powers. . . . The 
Governors of the states involved in actual anthrax attacks all realized that bioterrorism is fundamentally a 
federal issue, and quickly called for action by both the FBI and the CDC to deal with the attacks.”). 
123  Id. at 60 (“[S]uch immunity is something public health authorities should not want (even though it may 
have superficial appeal), because it means that they are not accountable for their actions, no matter how 
arbitrary.  The immunity provision thus serves only to undermine the public’s trust in public health 
emergencies.”). 
124 Annas, Blinded by Bioterrorism, supra note 84, at 55. 
125 Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism, supra note 85, at 88. 
126 See Markel et al., Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis, supra note 77, at 83 (noting that Speaker 
actually accelerated his travel plans after being notified of his condition, despite being warned of the risks 
to himself and others).   25 
individuals like Speaker behave irresponsibly, compulsory powers must exist to protect 
the public, and this necessity requires a trade-off between civil liberties and public safety. 
  Second,  while  national  security  is  a  federal  obligation,  “most  public  health 
activities take place at the state and local level,” and states “must have effective, modern 
statutory powers” if they are to coordinate effectively with federal agencies during a 
bioterrorist  emergency.
127    Without  effective  assistance  from  the  states,  the  federal 
government cannot respond effectively to a public health crisis. 
  Third, the immunity provisions of the Model Act were drafted in recognition “that 
if government officials, health professionals, and others are to fulfill their responsibilities 
for preventing and responding to a serious health threat, they should not fear unwarranted 
liability.”
128  The MSEHPA still provides for liability in cases of gross negligence or 
willful misconduct, but allows emergency workers the latitude they need for effective 
decision-making. 
Is The MSEHPA Constitutional? 
  The  MSEHPA  provides  procedural  due  process  protections  that  are  adequate 
under the Supreme Court’s civil commitment jurisprudence.  The following paragraphs 
apply the holdings of the five cases discussed earlier in this paper (O’Connor, Addington, 
Vitek, Youngberg, and Washington) to the provisions of the MSEHPA. 
  O’Connor v. Donaldson.
129  The provisions of the MSEHPA fit well with the 
holding of O’Connor, as well as Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence: 
O’Connor Holding / Burger 
Concurrence 
MSEHPA 
Confinement based on mental  Isolated and quarantined 
                                                 
127 Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism, supra note 85, at 87. 
128 Planning for and Response to Bioterrorism, supra note 87, at 626. 
129 422 U.S. 563 (1975).   26 
illness could not continue if the 
patient was no longer dangerous
130 
individuals must be immediately 
released when they pose no 
substantial risk of transmitting a 
contagious or possibly contagious 
disease to others.
131 
“[T]he mere presence of mental 
illness does not disqualify a person 
from preferring his home to the 
comforts of an institution.”
132 
“Isolation and quarantine must be 
by the least restrictive means 
necessary,” which may include 
home confinement.
133 
Burger (1) Commitment must be 
justified by a legitimate state 
interest
134 
Legitimate state interest is “an 
occurrence or imminent threat of 
an illness or health condition that” 
poses a high probability of a large 
number of deaths or serious 
disabilities, or widespread 
exposure to an agent that poses a 
significant risk of substantial future 
harm.
135 
Burger (2): reasons for 
commitment “must be established 
in an appropriate proceeding”
136 
Court orders quarantine when a 
preponderance of evidence shows 
quarantine is reasonably necessary 
to prevent the transmission of a 
contagious disease.
137 
Burger (3): “confinement must 
cease when those reasons no longer 
exist”
138 
See 1
st entry in this column. 
 
 
  Addington  v.  Texas.
139    The  MSEHPA’s  “preponderance  of  the  evidence” 
standard conflicts with Addington’s requirement that a burden “equal to or greater than 
the ‘clear and convincing’” standard is required for civil commitment.
140  The state’s 
interest  in  preventing  a  public  outbreak  of  disease  may  weigh  more  heavily  than  its 
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interest in committing the emotionally disturbed, which would justify a lower burden of 
proof.  This point seems somewhat irrelevant, however, since it could be said of any civil 
commitment for mental illness in comparison to civil commitment during a public health 
emergency. 
  Vitek v. Jones.
141  The court in Vitek held that the prisoner’s interest in not being 
transferred to a mental hospital warranted procedural safeguards such as notice, counsel, 
and an adversarial hearing before an independent decisionmaker.
142  Although MSEHPA 
allows for temporary quarantine without notice, quarantined individuals are entitled to 
counsel and an adversarial hearing before an independent court under the MSEHPA.
143 
  Youngberg  v.  Romeo.
144  The  Court  in  Romeo  held  that  Romeo  had  a 
constitutional right to safe conditions of confinement, and the right to training “as an 
appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate 
his  ability  to  function  free  from  bodily  restraints.”
145  The  MSEHPA  provides  for 
quarantine  premises  that  are  “safe  and  hygienic,”
146  as  well  as  medical  treatment,
147 
which could be analogized to the training which Romeo was entitled for his condition. 
  Washington v. Harper.
148  Analyzed under the due process standard enunciated in 
Washington, the MSEHPA seems to satisfy all facets of due process: 
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Washington Holding: Due process 
adequately addressed by… 
MSEHPA 
Medical, non-judicial decisionmaker
149  Judicial decisionmaker
150 
Prisoner not afforded counsel
151  Quarantined  individuals  afforded  counsel 
at state expense
152 
“clear, cogent, and convincing” standard of 
proof was “neither required nor helpful in 
determining  whether  to  forcibly  medicate 
the prisoner.”
153 
Preponderance  of  the  evidence  standard 
(one step less than clear and convincing)
154; 
quarantined  individuals  can  refuse 
treatment and face further quarantine
155 
 
Thus, it appears the MSEHPA meets or exceeds all of Washington’s requirements, and 
meets the requirements of the other four cases with the exception of Addington.  The 
degree to which the conflict with Addington poses a constitutional problem is potentially 
lessened by the more conservative membership on today’s Supreme Court, although the 
MSEHPA  would  be  a  stronger  document  if  its  standard  of  proof  was  “clear  and 
convincing evidence.” 
Is the MSEHPA Better Than Pre-existing State Law? 
The MSEHPA, while not perfect, is vastly preferable to the antiquated laws it 
replaces.    Most  pre-MSEHPA  state  law  (1)  did  not  require  procedural  due  process 
protections
156; (2) limited the ability of states to collect information necessary to detect 
and respond to an emerging public health crisis
157; and (3) did not provide a full range of 
modern  public  health  powers,  such  as  directly  observed  therapy,  that  are  critical  to 
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modern interventions.
158  In light of the existing deficiencies of state law, the MSEHPA 
was a giant leap forward in preparation and response to public health emergencies. 
The Proposed Revisions to CDC Quarantine Regulations 
  In  2005,  the  CDC  proposed  the  first  update  to  its  quarantine  regulations  in 
roughly  40  years.
159    These  proposed  regulations  were  designed  to  address  three 
fundamental problems: 
First, federal powers apply only to a small number of diseases, depriving 
the CDC of flexibility to respond to novel threats. For a new threat, the 
president must issue an executive order making the disease quarantinable, 
as  happened  with  SARS  (severe  acute  respiratory  syndrome)  and 
pandemic  influenza.  Second,  federal  rules  do  not  authorize  a  range  of 
powers,  including  screening,  contact  tracing,  and  directly  observed 
therapy, which may be needed to address certain threats, including XDR-
TB. Third, federal quarantine law lacks adequate due process protections 
because  it  does  not  give  affected  individuals  a  right  to  a  fair  hearing. 
Given  constitutional  requirements  for  an  impartial  hearing  for  anyone 
under civil detention or confinement, including people with TB, federal 
quarantine powers are arguably unconstitutional.
160 
 
The new regulations address these problems in a number of ways.  They define the term 
“ill  person”  to  “include  those  with  signs  or  symptoms  commonly  associated  with 
quarantinable diseases (e.g., fever, rash, persistent cough, or diarrhea), thus affording 
CDC greater flexibility.”
161  The proposed regulations also: 
would require airlines and other carriers to screen passengers at borders; 
report cases of illness or death to the CDC; distribute health alert notices 
to  crew  and  passengers;  collect  and  transmit  personal  passenger 
information; order physical examination of exposed persons; and require 
passengers to disclose information about their contacts, travel itinerary, 
and  medical  history.  The  proposed  rules  also  build  more  due  process 
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protections  into  federal  quarantine  law  [such  as  providing  a  right  to  a 
hearing].
162 
 
The regulations drew fire for (1) not providing a right to a hearing for up to 3 
business  days  during  a  “provisional”  quarantine;  (2)  appointing  CDC  employees  as 
decisionmakers  at  the  hearings,  rather  than  an  impartial  decisionmaker;  (3)  imposing 
tremendous costs on the travel industry to collect and transmit passenger information; and 
(4)  having  inadequate  privacy  protections  to  safeguard  traveler  data.
163    As  of  this 
writing, the regulations have not been officially adopted, although it is worth noting that 
CDC officials offered XDR-TB patient Andrew Speaker the option of a hearing.
164  It is 
possible  that  the  CDC  has  adopted  an  unspoken  policy  of  affording  due  process  (in 
practice) to any persons it may quarantine in the future. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, modern public health challenges from disease and bioterrorism will 
continue  to  frame  the  debate  over  modernization  of  quarantine  law.    Although  these 
debates involve tough choices and trade-offs between liberty and safety, these debates are 
valuable and extremely necessary.  In their absence, this nation could find itself wholly 
unprepared for the emergencies likely to occur in the twenty-first century. 
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